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Scope Ambiguity Approach de re / de dicto distinctionDummett: (2) is ambiguous in natural language. It has a wide reading and a narrow reading: $(2n) \diamond (\exists x)(Mxm \land \neg Mx)$ $(2w) (\exists x)(Mxm \land \diamond \neg Mx)$ Note: Mxm = x is the mother of Mary; Mx = x is a mother; Mxm $\rightarrow$ Mx(a) Aristotle was fond of dogs. (b) The last great philosopher of antiguity was fond of dogs.Dummett: Modal differences only occur when you consistently construe (2) as (2p).(a) Aristotle was fond of dogs. (b) The last great philosopher of antiguity was fond of dogs.	Scope Ambiguity Approach de re / de dicto distinctionDummett: (2) is ambiguous in natural language. It has a wide reading and a narrow reading: $(2n) \circ (\exists x)(Mxm \land \neg Mx)$ $(2w) (\exists x)(Mxm \land (\neg Mx))$ Note: Mxm = x is the mother of Mary; Mx = x is a mother; Mxm $\rightarrow$ Mx(a) Aristotle was fond of dogs.Dummett: Modal differences only occur when you consistently construe (2) as (2n).(b) The last great philosopher of antiguity was fond of dogs.Carlow (a) Aristotle was fond of dogs.(b) The last great philosopher of antiguity was fond of dogs.(c) Aristotle was fond of dogs		Let's stipulate the proper name 'St. Anne' as 'the mother of Virgin Mary.' (1) St. Anne might not have been a mother. (2) The mother of Virgin Mary might not have been a mother.	<ul> <li>Scope ambiguity fails to account for our modal intuition in simple sentence</li> <li>that does not contain modal operator;</li> <li>that does not contain any scope.</li> </ul>
• When (a) and (b) are evaluated in a counterfactual situation, the picture generated by our intuition contains <i>ipso facto</i> that Aristotle was fond of dogs, not someone who is qualitatively indsicernible from Aristotle was fond of dogs.	<ul> <li>(2m) (CLX) (MXM (× 1MX)</li> <li>(2w) (∃x) (MXm ∧ ◊¬MX)</li> <li>Note: Mxm = x is the mother of Mary; Mx = x is a mother; Mxm→Mx</li> <li>Dummett: Modal differences only occur when you consistently construe (2) as (2n).</li> <li>When (a) and (b) are evaluated in a counterfactual situation, the picture generated by our intuition contains <i>ipso facto</i> that Aristotle was fond of dogs.</li> <li>Ref: Saul Kripke, "Preface," in Naming and Necessity, pp. 10-5 &amp; pp. 6-7.</li> </ul>	Scope Ambiguity Approach de re / de dicto distinction	Dummett: (2) is ambiguous in natural language. It has a wide reading and a narrow reading: $(2p) \ \phi(\exists x)(M \times m \land \exists M \times)$	<ul><li>(a) Aristotle was fond of dogs.</li><li>(b) The last great philosopher of antiguity was fond of dogs.</li></ul>
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$\wedge \diamond \neg Mx$ ) is the mother of Mary; Mx = x is a mother; ences only occur when you consistently construe (2)	counterfactual situation, the picture generated by our intuition contains <i>ipso facto</i> that Aristotle was fond of dogs, not someone who is qualitatively indsicernible from Aristotle was fond of dogs. Ref: Saul Kripke, "Preface," in <i>Naming and Necessity</i> , pp.10-5 & pp.6-7.	Disalignment of Necessity & Aprioricity (9) If Vigcent Furnier exists, Vinceent Fornier is Abce Cooper. Sentence (9) is necessary a posteriori.	Motivation for Description Theory         (1) Art thinks that Alice Cooper is a rock musician.       True       True	Related Concern $Fa$ $a = b$ $\therefore$ $Fb$ But remember that $a = b$ is something like	Simple Nominal Description Thery         Line Cooper         Alice Cooper       The person called 'Alice Cooper';         Vincent Furnier       • C: There are more than one Alice Cooper. Then how can the description uniquely pick out the intended referent?         • A: Use context!       • A: Use context!         • The person called 'Vincent Furnier'       • The name 'Alice Cooper' is equivalent to	Is SNDT acceptable? Goals of SNDT: 1. Providing an account of how proper names succeed in referring to objects; 2. Providing an account of the controbution of proper names to the meaning of sentences Anaphoric Link	Sense & Direct Reference         "If we reject every form of description theory, then we have to accept that names are directly referential [p.90, my bold & italics]"       > Why?         Direct Reference (DR)         • (DR) An expression is directly referential iff       "Being directly referential is more fundamental than being rigid desginators.	<ul> <li>Sense &amp; Direct Reference</li> <li>Rigidity thus understood may be compatible with a neo-Fregean SENSE (the account of SENSE that is dependent on reference). [p.90]         <ul> <li>(13) Alice Cooper is a rock musician.</li> <li>(14) Vincent Furnier is a rock musician.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity (2) • Rigidified definite descriptions are synonymous Example redicate; $A_w$ be our actual world; r of Alexander. Aristotle is F The tutor of Alexander is F Aristotle is F The tutor of Alexander in $w^*$ is F he actual teacher of Alexander. Aristotle is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F he actual teacher of Alexander in $A_w$ is F Aristotle is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is F The tutor of Alexander in $A_w$ is F is uttered in the actual world $A_w$ , it will possible world iff Aristotle did taught freat in $A_w$ , thus 'Aristotle' and its rigidified	<b>2002), p.40</b> with proper name. <i>assible worlds</i> are possible states of <i>a catual world</i> is a state of the brid, expressing how things are the tys they are; <i>a catual world</i> does not have special tological status; <i>a world</i> could have turned out to ve a different history. I teacher of Alexander the Great" <i>normal</i> DD because it could have <i>a person</i> other than Aristotle, <i>e</i> alternative history ( <i>e.g.</i> Aristotle dup by Abbasidian scholars) milar attempts <sup>1</sup> by dint of a fixed thal world", fail for similar reason	Consequence of Embracing Rigid Designators          Individualist Account of Naming         Each individual being capable of picking out the object referred to by means of what she herself knows about that object.         Frege & Russell         • The meaning of a community is nothing but the overlap between such individual conceptions;         • An object referring to the object later on.	<ul> <li>(2) Art thinks that Vincent Furnier is a rock musician.</li> <li>False True Intuition Millian Theory Intuition Millian Theory in the world, rather than things in the mind.</li> <li>Description Theory as an account of giving meaning to proper names is quite dead;</li> <li>Can we find an alternative account of description theory that is only meant to explain why (1) is true and (2) is false?</li> <li>Simple Nominal Description Theory (SNDT)</li> </ul>	Hesperus is Phosphorus, it is necessarily true!Recall that in A, B, C $\vdash$ D, if B is necessarily true, we're allowed to drop it, and A, C $\vdash$ D is still valid. Can we drop $a = b$ as well? $\frac{Fa}{\therefore Fb}$ Let a = Reiner Braun, b = Armored Titan, Fx = x is a Marleyan enemy.Arg.1 Arg.2Armored Titan is a Marleyan enemy.Armored Titan is a Marleyan enemy.Armored Titan is Reiner BraunReiner Braun is a Marleyan enemy.Reiner Braun is a Marleyan enemy.Mrg.1 is a necessitation, and it is a priori; Arg.2 is a necessitation only in the validity sense, it is a posteriori.We reject the a priori bit, and we don't like that.	<ul> <li>some description + contextual info: <ul> <li>"the person who and is called 'Alice Cooper'</li> <li>"the person who is called 'Alice Cooper'</li> <li>"the person who is called 'Alice Cooper'</li> </ul> </li> <li>(DN1) To every name or designating expression X, there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties \$\phi\$ such that A believes that \$\phi(X)\$.</li> <li>(DN2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to individual uniquely.</li> <li>(DN3) If most, or a weighted most, of the \$\phi\$'s are satisfied by one unique object, y, then y is the referent of X;</li> <li>(DN4) If the vote yields no unique object, X does not refer;</li> </ul> (NC) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. (NC) is a requirement for theories that attempts to explain the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) is meant to explain the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) by is meant to explain the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) Provide the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) Provide the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) Provide the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) is a requirement for the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) Suppring the explain the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) Suppring the explain the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) Suppring the explain the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) Suppring the explain the difficulty of swapping co-referential names within sychological contexts. (NC) Suppring the difficulty of swapping co-re	<ul> <li>Kripke suggested that reference of a name is determined by a history of links back to an initial baptism.</li> <li>↑ implies that proper names work anaphorically.</li> <li>(11) A woman came into the room. She was the person everyone was looking for.</li> <li>(12) Carol came into the room. Carol was the person everyone was looking for.</li> <li>In SNDT, proper names are equivalent to definite descriptions. However, it is not clear how a definite description can carry an anaphoric link.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>1. If Prefer to the particular object;</li> <li>2. It does not refer to that particular object, on every occasion of its use, in virtue of t hat object's satisfying some description.</li> <li>(p.90, my bold &amp; italies)</li> <li>(p.90, my bold &amp; italies)</li></ul>	If for some individual (13) is true while (14) is false, it means that the two sentences differ in <i>informativenesss</i> despite <i>sameness</i> of reference. <b>neo-Fregean SENSE (NFS)</b> 1. If we are acquiated with an object, we are bound to be acquainted with it in some way (e.g. by reading or direct perception); 2. There is nothing indirect about how we are acquainted with an object under a certain mode of presentation; (compatible with rigidity thus understood) 3. If (1) is true, then it must be possible not to realize that the object we are acquainted with in one way is the same as the obeject we are acquainted with in another way; (Basis of alternative conception of SENSE) NFS does not commit ourselves to the condition that names be equivalent to definite descriptions, nor does it commit ourselves to think names refer to their referent indirectly → we shouldn't accept Millian view.

- Two-Dimensionalism Rigidify definite description using indexical terms, e.g. 'actual'
- "I" picks out the person making the utterance;
  "here" picks out the place where the utterance is made;
  "now" picks out the time around the utterance.
  artes's "I exist" is another famous example, it is diagonally necessarily (but sadly there is nothing necessary about your existence, nor is it ssary that you cannot cease to exist).
- $w_4$  F F F T

• (a) is not necessarily true.