

命题态度的语义学

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Introduction

- 1) 语义学的任务
- 2) 命题态度的结构：表述心理的动词+that从句
- 3) 本章的主要任务：How are we to explain what the words are doing in these 'that'-clauses? How can we provide a semantics for propositional-attitude constructions?

Kripke, names, necessity, and propositional attitudes

- 1) Modal and epistemic distinctions
- * The difference between what is necessary and what is contingent is a modal distinction, and it concerns the nature of things themselves
- * The difference between what is a priori and what is a posteriori (between what can and what cannot be known independently of experience) is an epistemic distinction

Kripke, names, necessity, and propositional attitudes

- (1) If there is any such person as Vincent Furnier, Vincent Furnier is Vincent Furnier.
- 当我们说 (1) 是先天必然的时候，我们说了以下内容：
- (1a) It is necessarily true that if there is any such person as Vincent Furnier, Vincent Furnier is Vincent Furnier;
- (1b) It can be known independently of experience that if there is any such person as Vincent Furnier, Vincent Furnier is Vincent Furnier.
- Kripke: Proper names are rigid designators (Proper names are directly referential...Their function, one might say, is just to refer.)
- (1a`) 必然地，太阳系行星的数目 >3
- (2b) It can be known independently of experience that, if there is any such person as Vincent Furnier, Vincent Furnier is Alice Cooper (事实上， Vincent Furnier is Alice Cooper)

Kripke, names, necessity, and propositional attitudes

- 2) Frege: names must have Sense as well as reference.
- 3) Kripke: names "refer, but 'have, strictly speaking, no signification'", following Mill
- 4) 因此Kripke试图表明我们得出 (2b) 为假的推理是成问题的

Kripke's Pierre

- 1) 动机：为何我们会觉得，我们无法独立于经验地知道 Vincent Furnier is Alice Cooper ? 一个很自然的想法：我们没办法仅仅通过理解这些词就知道。（那就加条件呗 😊）
- 2) Sentence-belief principles :
- (SB1) If someone understands a sentence and thinks it is true 【对utterance的态度】 , then she believes what the sentence says;
- (SB2) If someone understands a sentence and does not think it is true, then, provided she is rational, she does not believe what the sentence says.
- Example:
- (2) If there is any such person as Vincent Furnier, Vincent Furnier is Alice Cooper.

Kripke's Pierrere

- 1) Translation principle:
- (TP) A good translation of a sentence can be used to say what the original sentence says.
- 2) kripke's puzzle:
- Pierre is brought up in China, and is taught about the world in China.
- (3) 伦敦很美。
- Later on he moves to England, learns English by the direct method, and settles in a very ugly part of London. So he says, ironically:
- (4) London is pretty.
- (5) Pierre believes what (3) says.
- (6) Pierre believes that London is pretty.
- (7) Pierre does not believe what (4) says.
- (8) Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.

Kripke's Pierrere

- 3) A version without TP
- Paderewski was a famous romantic pianist who became prime minister of Poland in later life.....When he (Peter) comes across the name in connection with the Treaty of Versailles, Peter is happy to accept this:
- (9) Paderewski is a politician.
- 但是当有人问唱片目录的那个Paderewski是不是政治家的时候，Peter thinks (9) is false。
- 在这两种情形，Peter can understand (9)，因此依据 (SB1)有：
- (10) Peter believes that Paderewski is a politician.
- 依照 (SB2)有：
- (11) Peter does not believe that Paderewski is a politician.
- 4) kripke的困惑不仅发生在专名上，同时也可能出现在natural-kind term,甚至其它词身上。
- 5) The Paderewski case shows that all we need to create a puzzle case is for someone to think wrongly, but rationally, that a particular word is ambiguous, while still counting as understanding the word enough for (SB1) and (SB2) to apply.

Referential solutions to the puzzle

- 1) Frege introduced the notion of Sense initially in a way which defined it in terms of informativeness: two expressions which differ in informativeness count as differing in Sense.
- 2) Two sentences differ in informativeness if it is possible for someone who understands both rationally to think that one is true and not think the other is true.
- 3) That seems to commit him immediately to (SB1) and (SB2). 【在命题态度的语境中，that从句的所指不再是真值，而是sense。因此，在信息量上不同，从而可能出现一个语句为真，而另外一个语句为假。】

Referential solutions to the puzzle

- 4) Could we deny either (SB1) or (SB2), as part of a generally non-Fregean view? 【换言之，我们就可以避免矛盾】 作者的观点：Someone who holds a Millian conception of names will naturally deny (SB2)
- (12) Vincent Furnier is a man.[T]
- (13) Frankie believes that Vincent Furnier is a man.[T]
- (14) Frankie believes that Alice Cooper is a man.[Therefore,T]
- (15) Alice Cooper is a man.[fact: don't know]
- (16) Frankie does not believe that Alice Cooper is a man.[If we applied (SB2) on the basis of that fact]
- 按照Mill的指称理论，(14)为真，那么(16)只能为错，而我们是基于(SB2)和背景信息(作为事实)得出(16)的，既然(16)为假，那么(SB2)也为假。

Referential solutions to the puzzle

- Nathan Salmon的方案：
- The business of a sentence is to encode information about the world.
- Two singular terms which refer to the same object encode the same Information.
- Therefore, propositional attitudes were regarded just as attitudes to Information.
- Just as it's possible not to recognize a person you know if she appears in a disguise, so it's possible not to recognize Information you know, if it's dressed up in unfamiliar words, in a different sentence.

Referential solutions to the puzzle

- (10) Peter believes that Paderewski is a politician;
- (11) Peter does not believe that Paderewski is a politician.
- (10a) There is some guise such that Peter believes the Information that Paderewski is a politician under that guise.
- (11a) There is some guise such that Peter does not believe the Information that Paderewski is a politician under that guise.
- (10a) and (11a) do not contradict each other. This is because there are two different guises of the same Information expressed by the same sentence, 'Paderewski is a politician'.

Referential solutions to the puzzle

- Modification of (SB1) and (SB2) :
- (SB1a) If someone understands a sentence and thinks it is true, then there is a guise under which she believes what the sentence says;
- (SB2a) If someone understands a sentence and does not think it is true, then, provided she is rational, there is a guise under which she does not believe what the sentence says.
- 因此，salmon的理论会承认，如果（13）为真，（14）也会为真。
- (13) Frankie believes that Vincent Furnier is a man.
- (14) Frankie believes that Alice Cooper is a man.
- 但是对于（16）为真，该理论提供了一些直觉。
- (16) Frankie does not believe that Alice Cooper is a man.
- (14a) There is some guise such that Frankie believes the information that Alice Cooper is a man under that guise;
- (14a) There is some guise such that Frankie believes the information that Alice Cooper is a man under that guise;

A Fregean response

- 大部分人可能会认为 (14) 为假。
- (14) Frankie believes that Alice Cooper is a man.
- 因此我们对Salmon的理论做出调整：让命题态度中的词也来参与意义表达，即表达那个伪装。故 (14) 可以改写为如下：
- (14*) There is some guise expressed by the sentence 'Alice Cooper is a man' such that Frankie believes the information that Alice Cooper is a man under that guise. 【然而事实是，根本不存在这样的伪装，Frankie压根就认为“Alice Cooper is a man”这个句子是假的。因此，(14*) 为假。】
- (16a*) There is some guise expressed by the sentence 'Alice Cooper is a man' such that Frankie does not believe the information that Alice Cooper is a man under that guise.
- (16b) It is not the case that there is some guise expressed by the sentence 'Alice Cooper is a man' such that Frankie believes the information that Alice Cooper is a man under that guise.
- 我们采取 (16b) 的翻译。
- 这样调整后，整个理论和弗雷格的理论很接近。理由：1，保留了某种形式的 (SB1)和 (SB2) ；2，伪装 (guise) 和弗雷格的涵义 (sense) 很接近。

A Fregean response

- 那么弗雷格式的方案能解决克里普克的困惑吗？
- (6) Pierre believes that London is pretty;
- (8) Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.
- (6a) Pierre believes that the city he heard of in his youth is pretty;
- (8a) Pierre does not believe that the city in which he now lives is pretty
- (6a) 和 (8a) 不矛盾，不能说明 (6) 和 (8) 不矛盾。因为一个是专名，一个是摹状词。这正是克里普克所批评的。

Davidson's proposal

- 1) Most of the tradition has treated the whole 'that'-clause in this kind of construction as a complex singular term.
- (6f) Pierre believes that-London-is-pretty.
- 2) Quine's proposal:
- (6q) Pierre believes-true 'London is pretty'.

Davidson's proposal

- 3) Davidson's principal focus is on constructions of indirect speech.
- (17) Galileo said that the earth moves.
- (17a) The earth moves. Galileo said that.
- (17b) Galileo said that. The earth moves.
- For predicate, this sentence here consists of a two-place predicate, 'x said y'. The 'y' position is filled with a demonstrative, 'that'.
- 4) paratactic analysis about the word "say"
- (17c) Galileo spoke to an effect which we can capture with this utterance. The earth moves.
- 推广到命题态度，并分析 (10) :
- (10c) Peter is in the kind of state of mind which would lead him, if he were in my present position, to produce this utterance. Paderewski is a politician.

Davidson's proposal

- 我们关心的问题：1，整个语句的意义是如何由部分的意义所决定的。2，如何理解各种命题态度的词。
- Davidson的方案的影响：这并不是语义学的问题了。因为这是两个句子了。
- (18) Jack and Jill were sitting like this.
- 然后我们再给一些描述性的picture。

Can Davidson's proposal solve Kripke's puzzle?

- 解决克里普克的困难的的关键在于解释如下两个语句为何不是矛盾的：
- (6) Pierre believes that London is pretty;
- (8) Pierre does not believe that London is pretty.
- 戴维森式的策略：
- (6b) Pierre is in the kind of state of mind which would lead him, if he were in my present position, to produce this utterance. London is pretty.
- (8b) Pierre is not in the kind of state of mind which would lead him, if he were in my present position, to produce this utterance. London is pretty.
- 如果“my present position”不同，则 (6b) 和 (8b) 不矛盾。
- 但是戴维森式的方案真的可行吗？
- One issue is whether the 'that' which introduces the 'that'-clauses in propositional-attitude constructions is really a demonstrative, and if it is, what it refers to.
- If it is a demonstrative, it's far from clear that Davidson is right to think it refers to the utterance of the sentence which follows (rather than, for example, the sentence itself, or the meaning of the sentence)?